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Abstract Major economic crises may promote structural reforms, by increasing the cost of
the status quo, or hinder them, by inducing more demand for protection. The ideology and
political partisanship of the ruling government may be crucial in determining the prevailing
course of action. In good times, conservative parties are typically pro-reform. However, do
these parties try to exploit periods of crisis to carry out their reforms? Do social-democratic
parties support even greater social protection? To answer these questions, this paper uses
indicators of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial markets for 25 OECD
countries over the 1975–2008 period. The empirical analysis confirms the ambiguous effect
of crises: product markets are liberalized, but financial markets become more regulated. Par-
tisan politics also matters, as right parties are associated with more pro-market reforms. Yet,
crises modify partisan politics: right-wing parties refrain from promoting privatizations, and
oppose the introduction of greater financial market regulations. By contrast, center parties
liberalize and trim unemployment benefits generosity, while left parties privatize. Further-
more, weak, fractionalized governments, which are associated with more regulated product
markets, are also more likely to liberalize during a crisis.
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1 Introduction
Major economic crises require quick policy responses. As the recent financial (and eco-
nomic) crisis has clearly shown, recessions spark expansionary fiscal and monetary policies,
but also labor market reform measures aimed at increasing job security and providing active
labor market policies to the unemployed. Structural reforms are often called for in a crisis.
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The economic rationale behind these pro-reform forces is that in countries with strong fi-
nancial and labor market regulations, a crisis brings a sense of urgency by raising the cost
of the status quo. Hence, policy-makers are forced to react and reform.
Major crises, however, increase uncertainty (and perhaps anxiety) among many individ-
uals (entrepreneurs, workers, retirees), who will demand more safeguards, particularly in
the labor and product markets. This may end up hindering structural reforms, which tend
to generate heavy short-term costs, often concentrated onto a particular category of indi-
viduals (for example, public-sector workers in the case of a privatization), and only diffuse,
long-term gains. Crises may thus lead to more government intervention in the economy.
Whether, in response to a crisis, pro-market structural reforms are adopted or the role
of the state in the economy expands ultimately depend on political and electoral factors.
Political partisanship, for instance, shapes a government’s policies and its willingness to
reform. In particular, conservative governments are more likely to eliminate existing anti-
competitive measures, and hence to promote pro-market reforms. A government’s strength
in Parliament may also affect the ability to carry out reforms.
Does the role of political partisanship in promoting, or hindering, reforms change dur-
ing a crisis? If we extend the claim made in the partisan politics literature (see Sect. 2) to
times of economic crisis, we should expect conservative parties (more market-oriented for
ideological and electoral reasons) to be keen to take advantage of periods of crisis to put
forward their reform strategies. Social-democratic (left) parties, on the other hand, would be
even less keen on reforms in troubled economic times, reluctant as they are to pile additional
strains on their voters.
To test this claim, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of la-
bor, product, and financial market reforms in 25 OECD countries over the 1975–2008 period.
I use recent data on OECD indicators for labor and product markets. Product-market indica-
tors measure the level of anti-competitive regulation and the degree of public ownership in
seven non-manufacturing industries (electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger
transport, rail transport, postal delivery and telecommunications). Labor-market indicators
capture (1) the degree of employment protection legislation, which assesses the restrictions
placed on the firing processes by labor legislation and collective bargaining agreements;
and (2) the unemployment benefit replacement rate, a measure of welfare state generosity.
Furthermore, for retirement policies, OECD data on the implicit tax on continuing to work
for individuals aged between 60 and 64 year old are used. These taxes provide a measure
of the individual cost of postponing retirement. The financial market liberalization indica-
tor is provided by the IMF, and reports policy changes across seven different dimensions:
credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barri-
ers, state ownership in the banking sector, policies respecting securities markets, prudential
regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and restrictions on capital account.
The empirical analysis focuses on the role of major economic crises and of political
partisanship in promoting, or perhaps hindering, reforms. But, special emphasis is placed
on the politics of economic crises by examining how parties or governments of different
political orientations or strengths react to them.
The empirical findings show that crises may both enhance and hinder reforms. Budget
deficits, a common denominator in economic crises, promote liberalization in product mar-
kets, while severe economic recessions increase regulation in financial markets. The crucial
role of partisan politics is confirmed in OECD countries, particularly for product and labor
market reforms. Conservative governments appear to be associated with both liberalization
and privatization in product markets, and with less generous welfare states. However, parti-
san politics vary during crises. In times of economic turmoil, right parties seem to adopt a
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more moderate strategy: they refrain from promoting reforms, and oppose the introduction
of greater financial market regulation. By contrast, center governments introduce liberal-
ization measures and reduce unemployment benefits, while left-wing governments exploit
crises by privatizing.
Empirical analysis confirms that other features of ruling governments also matter. Frac-
tionalized governments—i.e., governments supported by a coalition of different parties—are
associated with more product market regulations. Again, periods of crisis modify the politics
of reform. Indeed, during an economic crisis, fractionalized governments become more in-
clined to liberalize product markets. Additional evidence shows that governments that have
been in power for a long time, and may therefore be responsible for the status-quo policy,
are less prone to liberalize product markets during crises.
These empirical results extend previous findings by Brooks and Kurtz (2007) on the in-
fluence of economic crises on different markets and countries, and evidence by Allan and
Scruggs (2004) on political partisanship, to different markets and sectors. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, economic crises emerge as unusual periods, during which political parties are willing
to cross ideological lines, to contradict their traditional political creeds, and to act exception-
ally. The fact that left-wing parties are willing to privatize, and center parties to liberalize
and reduce welfare state generosity, suggests that, during a crisis, these parties may learn the
true cost of these non-competitive regulations, and can credibly convey it to their electorate
(see Cukierman and Tommasi 1998). On the contrary, conservative parties are less inclined
to reform in tough economic times, possibly to avoid being blamed as ultra-liberal—and
thus having to face an electoral backlash. Even so, they do oppose higher financial market
regulations.
2 Related literature
There exists a large empirical literature on the policy response to economic crises. Looking
back at the aftermath of the Great Depression, Shughart (2011) depicts the New Deal as
a counterproductive policy response driven by electoral concerns. Similarly, Higgs (1987)
identifies a ratchet effect in policy responses to major crises, such as the two World Wars and
the Great Depression, that led to a huge increase in government intervention. Focusing on
more recent events, Drazen and Easterly (2001) analyze inflation and black market premium
to conclude that crises spur reforms. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) construct an aggregate in-
dicator of labor-market reforms to show that crises (defined as a sharp rise in the output gap
and higher unemployment rates) are associated with reforms. The empirical evidence in IMF
(2004) suggests instead that an ongoing economic crisis may actually hinder labor market
reforms, although the length of past economic crises may promote them. Using disaggre-
gated indicators, Høj et al. (2006) provide evidence that the direction of reforms differs for
insiders and outsiders: large increases in the long-term unemployment rate are associated
with less employment protection legislation for temporary workers and with more generous
unemployment benefits, but have no effect on employment protection legislation for per-
manent workers. Tompson (2009) analyzes 20 case studies of OECD countries to conclude
that labor market reforms were not correlated with economic crises. Using financial market
indicators, Abiad and Mody (2005) show that different economic crises lead to different
outcomes: a balance of payment crisis spurs reforms, but a banking crisis stands in the way
of liberalizations.
The interaction between politics and structural reforms has also been extensively an-
alyzed. Allan and Scruggs (2004) concentrate on the welfare state—namely on the rates
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of unemployment benefit replacement and sickness transfers—to show that, after the mid-
1980s, political partisanship matters, since retrenchments have been more likely under right-
wing governments. Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007) and Murillo (2009) study market
reforms in the Latin American public utilities sector, to conclude that ideological polariza-
tion and political competition have a bearing on reforms. Brooks and Kurtz (2007), for their
part, examine capital account and trade liberalization in 19 Latin American countries. They
find that crises do matter, but not always enough to promote liberalization. Capital account
openings occur during good economic times, while trade liberalization occurs in positive
trade-balance and/or hyperinflation contexts. Moreover, the former is more likely to occur
with fractionalized governments, where blame can be shared.
An analysis of the politics of crisis and its impact on reforms was also the objective of
Alesina et al. (2006). They study the stabilization of budget deficits and inflation rates to
conclude that crises promote fiscal reforms and adjustments—hence, the politics of crisis
matters. Furthermore, strong and new governments act faster. Pop-Eleches (2008) examines
Latin American and Eastern European countries to suggest that an economic crisis carries
substantial weight, but how much weight depends on the government’s partisan color.
Finally, in two recent papers, Congleton (2009, 2012) first studies the political and eco-
nomic determinants of the 2008 financial crisis, and then turns to the policy responses in
order to evaluate the relevance of public choice in explaining the crisis management and to
discuss the economics and politics of “crisis insurance” programs.
3 Reform patterns
At least until the 2008 financial and economic crisis, there seemed to be a growing consen-
sus over the need for structural reforms in many countries—reforms designed to improve
disappointing growth and to face emerging challenges, such as aging, new technologies,
and globalization. Nevertheless, the implementation of structural reforms over the past few
decades has varied considerably in pace and magnitude across countries, but also nation-
wide, across markets.
OECD indicators on anti-competitive regulation in seven non-manufacturing sectors
show that the timing and intensity of product market reforms have been very different across
countries. Figure 1 suggests that product market liberalization (measured as a reduction in
the anti-competitive regulation index) took off in the late 1980s and is still on-going. Yet,
different trends have emerged. The United States already was implementing comprehensive
reforms in 1975–1985, while the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway and, to a lesser
extent, Canada, Finland and Austria followed in the early to mid-1980s. For most other Eu-
ropean countries, product market liberalization was introduced in the 1990s under the influ-
ence of the EU’s internal market program, as well as accession to the Euro zone (see Alesina
et al. 2009). Across sectors, liberalizations started with road transport, later to spread to the
air transport industry and, from the mid-1990s, to the electricity and telecommunications
sectors (see Conway and Nicoletti 2006). Figure 2 shows noteworthy cross-country conver-
gence in product market regulations, owing to the fact that countries with strong regulation
in 1975, such as Italy, Portugal, France, Denmark, and Germany, have been more active in
deregulating their product markets.
IMF indicators of financial sector policies show that financial market liberalizations also
took place in many countries between 1973 and 2005. Again, the timing and magnitude
of the reforms varied widely from one country to another, as well as across the differ-
ent policy areas analyzed. Figure 3 suggests that financial market liberalizations (mea-
sured as an increase in the financial sector reform policy index) picked up speed in the
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Fig. 1 Product Market
Regulation in OECD countries.
Note: Index of Product Market
Regulation ranges from 0 (min
regulation) to 6 (max regulation)
Fig. 2 Convergence in
Production Market Regulation.
Note: Index of Product Market
Regulation ranges from 0 (min
regulation) to 6 (max regulation).
A negative variation (on the
vertical axis) indicates a Product
Market Liberalization
early 1980s. Again, different trends emerged. While Germany, Canada, the United States,
and the United Kingdom had already liberalized their financial sectors in the mid-1970s,
other OECD countries began to catch up in the late 1970s; the process is continuing to-
day. Policy reversals were also frequent, although more so in Latin America and East
Asia, where reforms were also generally more extensive (see Abiad and Mody 2005;
Abiad et al. 2008). Figure 4 shows considerable cross-country convergence in financial mar-
kets. The negative correlation between the initial level of financial regulation in 1973 and
the subsequent deregulation is remarkably strong.
Labor market reforms in OECD countries have proved more difficult to implement. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, many European countries adopted employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL), which increased labor market’s rigidity and hindered adjustments in job flows.
Additionally, early-retirement provisions were introduced in many social security schemes,
which created massive economic incentives to retire early. Since the late 1980s, however,
there have been some moves to make overall labor market regulation more employment
friendly, in particular with some easing of employment protection legislation (for a compre-
hensive analysis, see OECD 2006). This was mostly aimed at modifying the labor market
prospects of outsiders, that is, workers with temporary contracts and unemployed who had
few reemployment prospects, and was sometimes accompanied by targeted active labor mar-
ket policies. However, virtually no reform measures were implemented to reduce EPL for
regular workers on permanent contracts, with the notable exceptions of Spain, Portugal,
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Fig. 3 Financial Market
Regulation in OECD countries.
Note: Index of Financial Market
Regulation ranges from 0 (max
regulation) to 1 (min regulation)
Fig. 4 Convergence in Financial
Market Regulation. Note: Index
of Financial Market Regulation
ranges from 0 (max regulation)
to 1 (min regulation). A positive
variation (on the vertical axis)
indicates a Financial Market
Deregulation
Fig. 5 Employment Protection
Legislation 1985–2008. Note:
Index of Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) ranges from 0
(min protection) to 6 (max
protection)
and, to a lesser extent, Finland. Figure 5 shows how the overall index of EPL, which com-
bines regular and temporary workers, changed between 1985 and 2008. Other labor market
reforms, which affected the generosity of unemployment benefit systems, differed widely
across countries. For instance, Portugal boosted the generosity of its unemployment benefit
schemes considerably, while the Netherlands, along with many other countries, become less
generous (see Fig. 6). Reforms aimed at postponing retirement age only came later, from
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Fig. 6 Unemployment benefit
Generosity 1975–2007. Note:
The Unemployment Benefit
Replacement Rate is the ratio of
the unemployment benefit to the
worker’s previous wage
Fig. 7 Retirement Incentives in
1985–2003. Note: The Implicit
Tax on continuing to work, for
individuals aged from 60 to 64, is
the ratio between the (possible)
reduction in the net social
security wealth induced by
working one additional year and
the individual annual wage for
individuals aged from 60 to 64
the early 1990s; this was the case in Italy (1992, 1995 and 2004), Germany (1992, 1997
and 2003) and France (2003). Increases in the actual retirement age were pursued by leg-
islating rises in the legal (statutory) retirement age, and by reducing the incentives to retire
early. Figure 7 shows that Italy and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Belgium, France and
Germany, were particularly effective in curbing the incentives to retire early, as measured
by the implicit tax levied on workers aged 60 to 64 years who continued to hold jobs.
4 Economic and political determinants of reforms
4.1 Economic crises
The economic and political literature on structural policies has long suggested that eco-
nomic crises may prompt the adoption of reform measures (see Haggard and Kaufman
1992; Drazen 2000). Deep economic crises call for quick reactions. Whether or not this
actually translates into reform measures will depend on the perception of the sort of change
needed. Macroeconomic stabilization following hyperinflation or a budget crisis may more
readily be achieved (Rodrik 1996), either because it is easier to agree on the necessary
policy—as in the case of trade opening after hyperinflation (Brooks and Kurtz 2007)—or
because the crisis itself was the result of a war of attrition between socioeconomic groups,
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where the losing side ends up bearing the costs of stabilization (Alesina and Drazen 1991;
Drazen and Grilli 1993). Crises often induce expansionary policies and more government
intervention in the economy (Perotti 1999; Shughart 2011).
An economic crisis may also promote structural reforms, if existing institutions or regula-
tions are recognized to be, at least partially, responsible for the deterioration of the economic
conditions. For instance, in countries with more stringent labor market regulations and more
generous early-retirement provisions, reforms of pension schemes and labor market become
much more urgent. Yet, generous programs are also known to induce a status-quo bias, by
creating their own political constituencies made up of the beneficiaries of such programs and
bureaucrats. By raising the cost of the status quo, crises may impose a sense of urgency to
reform, if there is sufficient consensus that structural reforms may lead to recovery and boost
potential output. In particular, worsening economic conditions, together with the release of
relevant and reliable information on the cost of the status quo (Tompson 2009), may help
to weaken the resistance of the pro-status-quo coalitions (Nelson 1990, 1994), and persuade
risk-averse individuals, who are uncertain about the distribution of future benefits and costs
deriving from reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Laban and Sturzenegger 1994).
However, crises may also hamper pro-market reforms. In fact, during an economic crisis,
individuals and socioeconomic groups will be less willing to lose their rents or benefits,
unless alternative compensations are available. Furthermore, costly compensatory reform
packages are more difficult to finance during economic crises—particularly when crises are
associated with fiscal imbalances. So, while reforms aimed at a more efficient labor market
may be badly needed when unemployment rates are high, the economic crisis itself may also
delay reform measures. Indeed, more policy flexibility can be seen as imposing adjustment
costs on (other) workers already suffering from adverse economic conditions (Bean 1998).
Likewise, a debt crisis may lead to nationalization, additional regulation, and capital market
closure (Edwards 1995) in order to limit episodes of capital flight (Brooks and Kurtz 2007),
while major crises may trigger great reversals in financial liberalization (Rajan and Zingales
2003). Finally, the Great Depression led to more government intervention in the economy
and to more public spending (Higgs 1987; Shughart 2011).
4.2 Political partisanship and electoral constraints
For reform attempts to succeed, governments need to use their political capital to overcome
the resistance from within government itself, from opposition parties, and from crucial veto
players in society, such as labor unions or employers’ organizations (Tsebelis 2002). Several
political and institutional features affect a government’s incentives to reform, and ultimately
its reform strategy. Besides economic crises, ideological and electoral motivations, too, may
drive policy-makers to commit to a reform pattern.
The literature on political partisanship suggests that different political parties have di-
vergent policy preferences, as each party tries to appeal to its own constituency. Hence,
parties actively pursue different policies when in office (Boix 1998; Garrett 1998). Con-
servative governments are expected to adopt efficiency-enhancing policies to reduce the
role of the public sector in the economy through welfare state retrenchments and pri-
vatizations; but also to liberalize financial and product markets (Abiad and Mody 2005;
Brooks and Kurtz 2007). Left-wing governments emphasize instead equity and redistribu-
tive factors, and may therefore wish to expand the welfare state and social spending. Con-
trary to this view, however, a credibility argument has been put forward to explain why
some governments have successfully promoted reforms in sharp contrast to the prefer-
ences of their core political constituencies as well as, often, with their own electoral plat-
forms (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998). If voters are unable to verify whether a reform
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policy is pursued for purely ideological reasons or because it is economically expedi-
ent, they will more readily believe that economic motivations prevail if, for instance, lib-
eralizations are introduced by a left-wing government. While the expansion of the wel-
fare state and the introduction of protective labor market institutions have often been as-
sociated with the rising power of left-wing parties and trade unions (Esping-Andersen
1990), the retrenchment phase that started in the 1990s has not been linked to parti-
san politics (Pierson 1994). Similarly, no partisan political preference has been identi-
fied as a main driver of market reforms in Latin America in the 1990s (Stokes 2001;
Weyland 2002). However, this view has recently been challenged by Allan and Scruggs
(2004), who detected a significant impact of right-wing governments on the welfare state
retrenchment efforts that took place after 1980. It has also been challenged by Murillo and
Martinez-Gallardo (2007), who emphasize the importance of political competition, and, to a
lesser extent, the relevance of partisan preferences in the process of liberalization of public
utilities in Latin America. Recent empirical contributions (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) confirm
the role of political partisanship in policy decisions.
Partisan politics may be particularly relevant during an economic crisis, when there
is more need for—or at least more discussion about—reforming, and parties may differ
in their degree of interventionism and/or reform proposals (Alesina et al. 2006). Indeed,
Pop-Eleches (2008) suggests that even the very definition of crisis is—at least partially—
subjective since different political parties may have a different reading of a crisis and its
intensity, as well as of its root causes and possible solutions.
A different strand of literature has emphasized the role of the electorate in determining
economic policies and regulatory measures. In this case, policy-makers are identified with
opportunistic, non-partisan incumbent politicians, hoping to achieve re-election, or with the
parties backing candidates for public office drafting political platforms. In both cases, politi-
cians have personal interests in supporting economic policies that are supported by a major-
ity of the voters, or by the voters who are more easily convinced by the policies—the swing
voters (Stromberg 2008).
In this sense, a government’s tenure in office and the expected time to the next election
may affect the reform process. In the lead-up to a general election, a government may re-
frain from implementing reform policies with large short-term costs, but it may be more in
favor of policies with short-term benefits—and vice-versa with newly elected governments.
Well-functioning financial markets may, however, bring forward the long-term benefits of
reforms, thereby helping reformist governments to pursue their strategies (Buti et al. 2008).
A government’s political strength may also affect its willingness and ability to reform. Weak,
fragmented governments, which can count only on the support of a minority or a coalition in
Parliament, are not well equipped to pursue reforms (Brooks and Kurtz 2007). Indeed, they
may manage to implement policy changes, although their strategy will have to be founded
on a broader base for reforms. Conversely, strong governments may rely on their supporting
political majorities.
These considerations regarding the electoral costs and gains from reforming are remark-
ably appropriate for broad policy measures, such as retirement and labor market policies,
which naturally affect many individuals, and may potentially have major electoral repercus-
sions. Pension reforms are known to carry heavy political costs, since the elderly, who are to
suffer a cut-back, are “single-minded” (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999; Profeta 2002) over
social security benefits. In fact, while pension benefits comprise a large share of an elderly
retiree’s income, the interests of other (younger) individuals tend to be more diversified, as
they depend on their family status, occupation, income, and so on.
Recent research has downplayed the role of the median voter in determining economic
policy, and drawn attention to organized pressure groups and to partisan allies within the
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party structure (Nielson 2003). This approach seems particularly well suited for address-
ing the liberalization of product and financial markets, which may drive up costs for those
who stand to lose from the reform, and yield only small, diffuse benefits for the win-
ners.
4.3 Macroeconomic policy and external constraints
Monetary policy may affect structural reforms. In particular, to adopt a fixed exchange rate
regime, or a single currency (e.g., the case of the Euro), a country has to relinquish control
of monetary policy, which then prevents from using this policy to accommodate negative
shocks. This may create incentives to pursue structural reforms (such as liberalizations in
the labor and product market) in order to stimulate market-based adjustments (Bean 1998;
Duval and Elmeskov 2005; Obstfeld 1997). On the other hand, Saint-Paul and Bentolila
(2000) argue that, under a currency union, such as the European Monetary System, the
up-front cost of structural reforms may increase, since the use of expansionary aggregate
demand policies to accompany structural reforms becomes more limited, owing to fiscal
constraints and lack of monetary authority.
Openness to trade has also been recognized as an important determinant of liberalization
(IMF 2004). This is because more globalized countries are open to competition, which cre-
ates demand for more flexibility, but also for more protection. Small countries, which rely
heavily on foreign trade, tend to implement more reforms (Duval and Elmeskov 2005).
Reforms may be induced, not only by economic crises, but also by supranational con-
straints imposed by international agreements or treaties—the European Union (EU) is a case
in point. These have been instrumental in strengthening domestic competition (especially in
the service sector) or creating domestic institutions that stimulate reform (e.g., antitrust or
sectoral regulatory authorities). The implementation of the EU’s Single Market Program has
pursued the removal of remaining barriers to trade and FDI (often resulting in the abolition
or reduction of subsidies and protection).
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Measuring reforms
I consider structural reforms in product, labor and financial markets in 25 OECD countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
To measure product market reforms, I use data on anti-competitive regulations for the
period 1975–2007 collected by Conway and Nicoletti (2006), and described in detail in
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005). These regulatory indicators measure restrictions on compe-
tition and private sector governance in seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity and
gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post and telecommunications
(fixed and mobile)—on a scale from zero (the least restrictive) to six (the most restrictive).
The overall index of regulation includes information on entry barriers, public ownership,
market shares of the dominant player(s) (in the telephone, gas and railroad sectors), and
price controls (in the road freight industry). In particular, entry barriers cover legal lim-
itations on the number of companies in potentially competitive markets and rules on the
vertical integration of network industries. Public ownership measures the share of equity
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owned by central or municipal governments in firms of a given sector between two polar
cases: no public ownership (indicator takes value zero) and full public ownership (value of
six). In the benchmark regressions, I use two indices of overall regulation. A regulatory in-
dicator, which does not include public ownership, is obtained by averaging, in each of the
seven industries, the indicators of barriers to entry, market shares of new entrants, and price
controls; whereas an indicator that includes only public ownership information is a simple
average of public ownership over the seven industries.
Financial market reforms are measured using a recent IMF database that covers the period
1973–2005 (see Abiad et al. 2008, for a detailed description). Out of the 25 countries listed
above, data for Iceland and Luxembourg are not available. The database records financial
policy changes for seven different dimensions: credit controls and excessively high reserve
requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector,
policies on securities markets, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector,
and restrictions on capital account. In the regression analysis, I use the overall index, which
aggregates the liberalization scores for each category, and normalizes them between zero
and one. Unlike in the previous case (with the OECD product market indicator), the IMF’s
financial market reforms indicator takes a value of zero for the highest degree of repression
and of one for full liberalization.
To measure reform policies in the labor market, I consider two indicators of labor market
policies: the degree of employment protection legislation (EPL) for the 1985–2008 period
(data for Iceland and Luxembourg are not available), and the unemployment benefit replace-
ment rate (UB) between 1975 and 2007. Both indicators are provided by the OECD, and
described respectively in the OECD Employment Outlook (2004) and in the OECD Bene-
fits and Wages (several issues). The indicator of employment protection ranges from zero
to six (from least to most restrictive) and measures legislative restrictions imposed on the
firing processes and collective bargaining agreements. It is provided separately for regular
and temporary workers. For regular workers, the employment protection legislation indi-
cator measures three aspects: (i) difficulty of dismissal, i.e., legislative provisions setting
conditions under which a dismissal is “justified” or “fair”; (ii) procedural inconveniences
that the employer may have to face when starting the dismissal procedure; and (iii) notice
and severance pay provisions. The index also provides a measure of the regulation of fixed-
term contracts and temporary-work agencies, which captures the restrictions on the use of
temporary employees. The employment legislation for regular contracts constitutes the core
component of the overall summary index of EPL strictness that we use. The indicator of the
extent of insurance coverage provided in redundancy cases is based on the unemployment
benefit replacement rate, namely, the ratio of the unemployment benefit to the last wage. In
particular, I concentrate on the average of the unemployment benefit replacement rates of a
worker with average labor income over a three-year unemployment spell.
Retirement policies are captured by OECD data on the implicit tax on continuing to
work for individuals aged between 60 and 64, over the 1985–2003 period (data for Czech
Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Poland are not available). Postponing retire-
ment may involve a cost, if the present value of net social security wealth—given by the
discounted difference between future benefits and contributions—decreases when an indi-
vidual works one additional year. The implicit tax on continuing to work is calculated as
the average of the ratio between this reduction in the net social security wealth and the in-
dividual annual wage for individuals aged from 60 to 64 (see Duval 2004, for a detailed
description).
Data on political variables are from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
(DPI), compiled by Beck et al. (2001) and updated in 2007. Political partisanship is mea-
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Table 1 Years of crisis
Australia 1983
Austria 1984–1987
Belgium 1983–1987
Canada 1982–1983, 1992–1993, 1996
Denmark 1975, 1981, 1993
Finland 1977–1978, 1992–1996
Iceland 1992–1995
Ireland 1986–1987, 1993–1994, 2008
Japan 1984
Luxembourg 1982–1983, 1985, 1996–1997
Netherlands 1970, 1982–1983
New Zealand 1991–1992
Norway 1978–1984, 1989–1993
Portugal 1983–1987, 1994
Spain 1981–1986, 1994–1997
Sweden 1993–1994
United Kingdom 1981–1982, 1984
United States 1975, 1982–1983
sured by a dummy variable for right-wing governments. Electoral incentives (or, rather, con-
straints) are captured by the number of years to the next election. A measure of government
strength is given by the number of years that a government (namely the chief executive) has
been in office, both in current and previous administrations. A complementary index of the
government’s weakness is given by its degree of fractionalization, which measures the prob-
ability that two members of Parliament picked at random among the government’s parties
are from different parties.
To measure (major) crises, I consider situations in which the output gap, defined as the
difference between actual output and potential output, is below the 90th percentile of the em-
pirical density (which is equal −3.4 %). Data on output gap are from the OECD’s Economic
Outlook database. In our sample, this definition produces a total of 76 crises, as detailed in
Table 1. In these country-year observations, the dummy variable (crisis) takes a value of one.
EU membership is defined as a dummy variable set to one when a country is a member of
the European Union (after 1999), while the EU’s single market program dummy is set equal
to one when a country is in the EU’s Single Market Program (after 1993). Government fiscal
position is measured by the share of government net lending relative to GDP. The degree of
openness of a country, on the other hand, is given by the ratio between the sum of imports
and exports to GDP. The degree of efficiency of the financial markets is measured by the
stock market capitalization as a share of GDP, which is available only after 1988. These data
are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for these variables.
5.2 Empirical strategy
The dependent variables used in the econometric analysis correspond to the annual varia-
tions in the policy indicators described above for the product, labor and financial markets.
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis were divided into three groups: eco-
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Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Product Market Regulation 682 3.788 1.546 0.759 6
Public Ownership 682 4.039 1.332 0.827 6
Financial Market Regulation 576 0.755 0.229 0.095 1
EPL 487 2.071 1.024 0.208 4.188
Unemployment Benefit 623 28.275 13.199 0.347 64.944
Retirement Incentives 354 0.411 0.327 −0.164 1.051
Crisis 682 0.111 0.315 0 1
Right Government 682 0.452 0.498 0 1
Center Government 682 0.426 0.495 0 1
Left Government 682 0.122 0.327 0 1
Years to Election 682 1.647 1.273 0 4
Years in Office 682 3.789 2.821 1 16
Government Fractionalization 682 0.278 0.259 0 0.828
Openness 681 0.669 0.467 0.114 3.380
Government Net Lending 677 −0.027 0.044 −0.160 0.185
EMU 682 0.155 0.363 0 1
European Single Market 682 0.348 0.477 0 1
nomic factors (including a crisis dummy), political factors, and interactions between crisis
and politics.
A preliminary issue in the empirical analysis of the political economy of structural re-
form is how to identify such reforms. Previous work (Duval and Elmeskov 2005; Pop-
Eleches 2008; Abiad and Mody 2005) concentrated on radical reforms as characterized
by sudden, broad changes in the policy indicators. The econometric analysis in this pa-
per follows another strand of literature (Alesina et al. 2006; Allan and Scruggs 2004;
Brooks and Kurtz 2007), and examines all reforms, as measured by any variation in the
indicators of labor, financial and product market policies.
Some of these indicators are bounded (see Sect. 5.1) and display positive mass at one
extreme of the distribution. In these cases, which correspond to Product Market Regulation,
Public Ownership and Financial Market Regulation, I use a dynamic unobserved effect Tobit
specification, which allows for the lagged level of the policy indicator to be among the
explanatory variables in the regression equation. For the remaining three indicators, two
variables (EPL and Unemployment Benefit) are also bounded but show no density mass at
any extreme, while the last (Retirement Incentives) is not. For these three variables, I use a
linear specification.
The Tobit and linear models relate the level of a policy indicator (Y ) to the lagged level
of the policy indicator and to a set of lagged explanatory variables (X), according to the
following two equations:
Yi,t = Min
{
Y ,αYi,t−1 +
∑
j
βjXj,i,t−1 + υi + ηt + εi,t
}
,
Yi,t = αYi,t−1 +
∑
j
βjXj,i,t−1 + υi + ηt + εi,t ,
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where Y is the upper bound of the distribution of the variable Yi,t , i is a country index,
t is a time index, υi is a fixed country effect, ηt is a fixed time effect and εi,t is a random
error. A value of parameter βj below one hence identifies policy convergence towards some
(possibly country-specific) level.
Regression analyses based on panel cross-country/time-series data are associated with
well-known drawbacks (Beck and Katz 1995). The specifications used for this model try
to address some of these issues. First, since the reform indicators are very persistent (par-
ticularly, the labor market regulation indicators), the above specification includes a lagged
dependent variable. Second, all the economic and political explanatory variables are also
lagged. This is explained by the need to deal, in part at least, with simultaneity bias prob-
lems; but also to account for the fact that it takes time for politicians to respond to shocks,
and that there is an obvious lag between the beginning of the (political) reform process and
its implementation. Third, country and time fixed effects are used in all regressions, to ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity at country and year level. This allows one to filter out
of the analysis country- or year-specific unobserved components, and thus to identify the
effects of crises and political variables from within-country rather than from cross-countries
variations. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and of country- and year-fixed
effects clearly represents a conservative strategy.
Finally, in interpreting the empirical results, it is worth noticing that while the direct ef-
fect of political partisanship on reforms may suffer from an omitted variable problem, this
limitation is less severe when the effect is analyzed during an economic crisis. For instance,
a positive correlation between conservative governments and reform policies may be driven
by an underlying economic, social or political process (such as a need to reduce the role of
the state in the economy) that leads the voters to elect conservative governments precisely
because they want reforms to be implemented. However, unless one believes that major
economic crises are either easily predicted by the voters, or voluntarily generated by gov-
ernments, the reaction of conservative governments to a major, unexpected crisis identifies
the true effect of these government characteristics on policy reforms, at least during crises.
This justifies the emphasis on the role of political partisanship in a crisis.
6 Results
The first objective of this empirical analysis was to assess the bearing of economic crises and
political partisanship on structural reforms. All results are reported for six reform indicators:
the overall product market regulation indicator (Product Market Regulation), the indicator
of public ownership in the product market (Public Ownership), the financial market reform
indicator (Financial Market Regulation), employment protection legislation (EPL) and the
unemployment benefit replacement rate (Unemployment Benefits) for the labor market, and
the implicit tax on continuing to work (Retirement Incentives) for the retirement policy. All
of the tables below show the results of Tobit regressions for the first three variables and of
OLS regressions for all others.
In Table 3, the results of the regression analysis for our six reform indicators concern the
direct effects of a crisis and of the economic and political variables. The strong persistence in
the regulation indicators is apparent from the coefficients of the lagged dependent variables
being statistically highly significant and close to one. While major lagged economic crises
are not associated directly with deregulation in the product market, budget deficits, which
are common during economic crises, are correlated with liberalizations (column 1). On the
other hand, crises hinder privatizations (column 2), and are associated with an increase in
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Table 3 Crisis and political determinants of reforms
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.937***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.029)
Crisis −0.03 0.04* −0.01* 0.01 −0.04 −0.004
(0.029) (0.024) (0.006) (0.013) (0.153) (0.005)
Right Government −0.04* −0.05*** −0.00 −0.01 −0.22** 0.002
(0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.103) (0.003)
Center Government −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.06 0.014
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.018) (0.315) (0.013)
Years to Election 0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.12** 0.12*** −0.01 0.04 −0.18 0.002
(0.054) (0.045) (0.012) (0.031) (0.289) (0.010)
EMU −0.10*** −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.65*** −0.014*
(0.037) (0.031) (0.009) (0.015) (0.227) (0.007)
European Single
Market
−0.09** −0.12*** 0.00 −0.01 0.08 0.006
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.160) (0.006)
Government Net
Lending
0.60* 0.01 0.11 −0.04 −1.19 0.019
(0.314) (0.260) (0.074) (0.136) (1.541) (0.057)
Openness −0.07 0.00 0.01 0.07* −0.49 0.005
(0.084) (0.070) (0.025) (0.035) (0.585) (0.030)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 569 467 612 335
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
financial market regulation (column 3). Major crises have no impact on employment protec-
tion legislation (column 4), generosity of unemployment benefits (column 5), and incentives
to retire early (column 6).
Among all the political variables, political partisanship turns out to be particularly rele-
vant. Right-wing parties are associated with liberalization and privatization in the product
markets, and with less generous unemployment benefits. Weak governments, as measured
by their degree of fractionalization, are associated with more regulation of product markets
and fewer privatizations. Conversely, government tenure and time left before the next elec-
tion, which may capture the government’s electoral incentives, play no role in promoting or
hindering reforms. Finally, countries belonging to the Euro zone are associated with greater
liberalization of the product market and more generous unemployment benefit replacement
rates, while access to the European Single Market leads to product market liberalizations and
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Table 4 Crisis and political determinants of reforms II
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 0.89***
(0.027) (0.044) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.035)
Crisis 0.04 0.20** 0.02** 0.02 −0.29 −0.00
(0.078) (0.086) (0.012) (0.018) (0.283) (0.009)
Right Government −0.20*** −0.26*** 0.02*** −0.02* −0.15 0.01
(0.035) (0.039) (0.006) (0.009) (0.122) (0.004)
Center Government 0.10 −0.04 −0.01 0.01 −0.14 0.01
(0.094) (0.103) (0.015) (0.026) (0.436) (0.016)
Years to Election −0.01 −0.04*** −0.00 −0.00 −0.03 −0.00
(0.013) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.045) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.01 −0.01* 0.00 −0.00 0.05** 0.00
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.17 0.19 −0.04* 0.04 −0.24 0.01
(0.117) (0.129) (0.018) (0.039) (0.432) (0.013)
EMU −0.14** 0.14* 0.05*** −0.03 0.88*** −0.02***
(0.069) (0.076) (0.011) (0.021) (0.298) (0.009)
European Single
Market
−0.11 −0.13 0.04*** −0.02 0.13 0.01
(0.088) (0.097) (0.013) (0.020) (0.274) (0.008)
Government Net
Lending
3.55*** 4.16*** 0.51*** −0.06 −0.12 0.06
(0.635) (0.724) (0.102) (0.189) (2.304) (0.076)
Openness −2.56*** −3.06*** −0.17*** 0.04 −1.80 0.07
(0.260) (0.286) (0.055) (0.091) (1.393) (0.047)
Stock Market
Capitalization
−0.52*** −0.86*** −0.07*** 0.00 −0.20 −0.01
(0.070) (0.076) (0.012) (0.020) (0.268) (0.009)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 370 330 368 370 275
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
privatizations. Interestingly, the degree of trade openness is weakly associated with more
rigid labor market, suggesting that more international competition may actually increase de-
mand for protection. Table 4 shows that these results are robust to controlling for the degree
of efficiency of the financial markets, although these data are available only after 1988.
To examine the relevance of partisan politics during economic crises, Table 5 presents
the results of the regression analysis that include as explanatory variable the interaction
between the (lagged) crisis indicator and—separately—the (lagged) right-wing and center
government parties. An interesting pattern emerges. Parties mostly modify their reforming
behavior during crisis. Despite being on average more active in reforming product and labor
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Table 5 The effects of political partisanship during crises
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.94***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029)
Crisis −0.00 −0.02 −0.03*** 0.02 0.08 −0.01
(0.044) (0.038) (0.010) (0.018) (0.216) (0.008)
Right Government −0.04* −0.06*** −0.01 −0.01 −0.22** 0.00
(0.021) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.106) (0.004)
Center Government 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.56 0.02
(0.040) (0.033) (0.010) (0.020) (0.339) (0.017)
Right Govt ∗ Crisis 0.02 0.10** 0.03** −0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.056) (0.047) (0.012) (0.024) (0.283) (0.010)
Center Govt ∗
Crisis
−0.27*** 0.05 0.01 −0.03 −2.01*** −0.02
(0.081) (0.068) (0.020) (0.034) (0.565) (0.022)
Years to Election 0.01* −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.00
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.11** 0.12*** −0.01 0.04 −0.19 0.00
(0.054) (0.045) (0.012) (0.031) (0.289) (0.010)
EMU −0.12*** −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.54** −0.01**
(0.037) (0.031) (0.009) (0.016) (0.229) (0.007)
European Single
Market
−0.08** −0.12*** 0.00 −0.01 0.15 0.01
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.015) (0.163) (0.006)
Government Net
Lending
0.63** −0.00 0.11 −0.05 −1.17 0.02
(0.311) (0.259) (0.074) (0.136) (1.548) (0.056)
Openness −0.10 −0.00 0.01 0.06* −0.50 0.00
(0.084) (0.069) (0.025) (0.034) (0.583) (0.030)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 569 467 612 335
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
markets, right-wing governments in fact refrain from taking policy steps during major eco-
nomic crises. Indeed, they put a brake on increasing financial market regulations under crisis
(column 3), the reverse of what left-wing governments would do. Product market liberaliza-
tions (column 1) and cutbacks in unemployment benefit generosity (column 5) are promoted
by center governments, while left-wing governments are associated with more privatizations
(column 2) during crises. Again, the inclusion of stock market capitalization does not modify
the results (see Table 6).
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Table 6 The effects of political partisanship during crises
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.26*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.89***
(0.026) (0.043) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.035)
Crisis 0.08 0.19 0.02 0.02 −0.51 −0.02
(0.105) (0.123) (0.017) (0.026) (0.410) (0.014)
Right Government −0.19*** −0.26*** 0.02*** −0.02* −0.18 0.00
(0.034) (0.039) (0.006) (0.010) (0.122) (0.004)
Center Government 0.25*** 0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01
(0.092) (0.107) (0.017) (0.029) (0.461) (0.020)
Right Govt ∗ Crisis 0.17 0.14 0.00 −0.00 0.68 0.02
(0.136) (0.158) (0.022) (0.033) (0.533) (0.017)
Center Govt ∗
Crisis
−0.95*** −0.35 0.02 −0.04 −0.71 0.01
(0.190) (0.222) (0.031) (0.049) (0.802) (0.031)
Years to Election −0.01 −0.04*** −0.00 −0.00 −0.03 −0.00
(0.012) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.045) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.01** −0.02** 0.00 −0.00 0.05** 0.00
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.021) (0.001)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.09 0.13 −0.03* 0.04 −0.27 0.00
(0.107) (0.125) (0.018) (0.039) (0.428) (0.013)
EMU −0.22*** 0.10 0.05*** −0.04 0.78*** −0.02***
(0.064) (0.074) (0.011) (0.022) (0.300) (0.009)
European Single
Market
−0.06 −0.09 0.04*** −0.02 0.18 0.01
(0.081) (0.094) (0.013) (0.021) (0.276) (0.009)
Government Net
Lending
3.08*** 3.82*** 0.48*** −0.07 0.25 0.07
(0.587) (0.706) (0.102) (0.189) (2.273) (0.076)
Openness −2.64*** −3.19*** −0.20*** 0.03 −1.96 0.07
(0.239) (0.280) (0.055) (0.092) (1.396) (0.048)
Stock Market
Capitalization
−0.55*** −0.87*** −0.07*** 0.00 −0.24 −0.01
(0.064) (0.074) (0.012) (0.020) (0.263) (0.009)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 370 330 368 370 275
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Do other political factors become more or less relevant during an economic crisis? To
address this question, Tables 7 and 8 show the results of the regression analyses that include
as explanatory variable the interaction between the (lagged) crisis indicator and, respec-
tively, the (lagged) numbers of years in office for the current government, and the (lagged)
level of government fractionalization. In both cases, the importance of these political factors
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Table 7 The effects of government tenure during crises
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.94***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.029)
Crisis −0.10** 0.04 −0.01 0.01 −0.39 0.00
(0.043) (0.036) (0.010) (0.020) (0.258) (0.003)
Right Government −0.04* −0.05*** −0.00 −0.01 −0.23** 0.01
(0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.103) (0.013)
Center Government −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.04 −0.00
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.018) (0.313) (0.001)
Years to Election 0.01* −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.00
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.032) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.001)
Years in Office ∗
Crisis
0.02** −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.047) (0.011)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.12** 0.12*** −0.01 0.04 −0.17 −0.01*
(0.054) (0.045) (0.012) (0.031) (0.290) (0.007)
EMU −0.10*** −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.64*** 0.01
(0.037) (0.031) (0.009) (0.016) (0.226) (0.006)
European Single
Market
−0.09** −0.12*** 0.00 −0.01 0.11 0.02
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.161) (0.057)
Government Net
Lending
0.64** 0.01 0.11 −0.04 −1.09 0.00
(0.314) (0.260) (0.074) (0.137) (1.548) (0.030)
Openness −0.08 0.00 0.01 0.07* −0.57 0.00
(0.084) (0.070) (0.025) (0.035) (0.588) (0.003)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 569 467 612 335
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
increases during an economic crisis, but only for product market regulations. In particular,
although they are associated with more regulated product markets, during a crisis fraction-
alized governments apparently become more keen to implementing reform measures. Con-
versely, governments that have been in power longer, and may thus be responsible for the
status-quo policy, are less apt to liberalize product markets during economic crises.
All results are robust to dropping the top- and bottom-two ranked countries for each
dependent variable.
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Table 8 The effects of government fractionalization during crises
Variables (1)
Product
Market
Regulation
(2)
Public
Owner-
ship
(3)
Financial
Market
Regulation
(4)
EPL
(5)
Unemployment
Benefit
(6)
Retirement
Incentives
Lagged dependent 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.89*** 0.94***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.029)
Crisis 0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.05 −0.00
(0.040) (0.034) (0.009) (0.016) (0.195) (0.007)
Right Government −0.04* −0.05*** −0.00 −0.01 −0.23** 0.00
(0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.104) (0.004)
Center
Government
−0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.04 0.01
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.018) (0.313) (0.014)
Years to Election 0.01* −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.032) (0.001)
Years in Office −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
Govt
Fractionalization
0.13** 0.11** −0.01 0.04 −0.15 0.00
(0.055) (0.046) (0.012) (0.031) (0.291) (0.011)
Govt
Fractionalization ∗
Crisis
−0.20** 0.08 0.00 −0.01 −0.41 −0.01
(0.097) (0.082) (0.021) (0.046) (0.510) (0.019)
EMU −0.10*** −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.64*** −0.01*
(0.037) (0.031) (0.009) (0.016) (0.227) (0.007)
European Single
Market
−0.09** −0.12*** 0.00 −0.01 0.08 0.01
(0.038) (0.031) (0.009) (0.015) (0.161) (0.006)
Government Net
Lending
0.54* 0.03 0.11 −0.04 −1.23 0.02
(0.315) (0.261) (0.074) (0.138) (1.545) (0.057)
Openness −0.09 0.01 0.01 0.07* −0.53 0.00
(0.084) (0.070) (0.025) (0.035) (0.590) (0.031)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed
Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 661 661 569 467 612 335
Columns 1–3, Tobit regressions; columns 4–6, OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
7 Concluding remarks
Using a large dataset of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial markets for 25
OECD countries over the 1975–2007 period, I find supporting evidence that economic crises
matter for reforms. Do crises promote or hinder reform policies? In the theoretical literature,
arguments have been provided to support both views. The empirical analysis carried out
in this paper suggests that indeed both arguments apply. Budget deficits facilitate product
market liberalizations, but major economic crises are associated with fewer privatizations
and more financial market regulation. This last result goes a stage further than previous
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findings by Brooks and Kurtz (2007), who use a sample of 19 Latin American countries to
show that crises matter, but not always to promote financial liberalization.
Partisan politics also matters for reforms. Right-wing governments are associated with
liberalization and privatization in product markets, and with a less generous welfare state.
These findings confirm previous work by Allan and Scruggs (2004), who show that, since
the mid-1980s, welfare state retrenchments typically have been associated with right-wing
governments, and extend their results to the product market.
Perhaps more interestingly, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper has uncovered
an additional effect of political partisanship on structural reforms. Political parties propose
radically different responses to economic crises. Moreover, these responses also differs from
their usual political orientations in good economic times. In particular, the empirical find-
ings suggest that during crises, right-wing governments refrain from promoting reforms, but
they also object to stepping up financial market regulations. During major economic crises,
it is center and left-wing governments that contribute more substantially to reforms. The
former liberalize product markets and retrench unemployment benefit generosity; the lat-
ter privatize. A clear case of commitment to reforming in times of crisis is illustrated by
Spain’s Socialist government led by Felipe Gonzales. During the 1994–96 economic crisis,
Gonzales began to privatize major state-owned enterprises in the telecommunications and
energy sectors, such as Endesa, Repsol, Telefonica; eventually, in 1995, he closed down the
state-owned industrial holding company (Instituto Nacional de Industria).
These results seem to suggest that economic crises are unusual periods, during which
reforms may be more necessary in order to boost economic efficiency, and yet less palat-
able to individuals (and firms) facing tough times. In these situations, parties ideologi-
cally less ready to reform (in good times) may accordingly be more credible in convinc-
ing stakeholders—i.e., workers, voters, and unions—of the costs involved in these non-
competitive regulations and of the need to reform.
The empirical analysis suggests the existence of additional elements in this “politics
of crisis”. Strong governments which have been in power for a long time are less prone
to liberalize product markets, while weak—that is, fractionalized—governments liberalize
more. We can also infer from these results that blame avoidance might be a viable strategy
for introducing reforms. Fractionalized governments, which in good times find it difficult
to converge on a reform package, during crises may exploit the fact that the blame is to
be shared among all the parties supporting the governing coalition, and may thus be more
effective in reforming.
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